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Abstract 
In response to a request by NWDC, the Naval Postgraduate School agreed to 
research and revise the current Maritime Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO) TM 3-
22-5-SW for unmanned vehicles systems (UVS). The CRUDES fleet would 
immediately benefit by the removal of Captain’s gigs/second RHIB in favor of a 
unmanned surface vehicle (USV) in order to increase warfighting capabilities. An 
analysis of N86 CRUDES ROC/POEs revealed no impact to primary or secondary 
warfighting missions by removing the gig/second RHIB. In today’s capabilities-based 
warfighting, this replacement better supports the global concept of operations. The 
research was limited to sparsely deployed platforms, developmental project results, 
and test procedures as delineated in various UV concepts of operations. It was 
found that the preponderance of UVs remain largely experimental and not integrated 
into organizational Navy (SMD/FMD) or Marine Corps (TO&E) manpower 
management documents. The research found that unmanned vehicles are actually 
part of larger UV systems (which require human operators) and that simply adding 
UVs does not result in manpower cost savings. Some advantages of UVs are 
persistent on station time and removal of the human operator from potentially 
harmful and fatiguing environments. Research indicates that, though still in their 
infancy, Navy UV’s are being employed by naval personnel but closely supported by 
contractors while operating on Naval platforms and in Naval units. Additionally, the 
majority of existing UV tactics and training address ISR and undersea missions with 
no definitive operational doctrine for unmanned combat vehicles (UCV). The report 
includes an UV acronym list (Appendix B) extracted from publications (Appendix C), 
a notional launch-and-recovery procedure and a notional estimate of USV 
manpower requirements and watch organization. Significant consideration must be 
made in the design and acquisition process as to who will operate these systems. 
The responsibility and spatial acumen required to operate UVs must be delineated 
prior to the acquisition phase so as to include key performance parameters (KPP) in 
unmanned vehicle design. An UV’s size, tier of operational employment and payload 
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play a critical role in determining level of operator autonomy, responsibility (i.e., 
paygrade) and supervision. 
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In response to a request by Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) 
to update the maritime unmanned vehicle (UV) Tactical Memorandum (TM 3-22-5 
SW), NWDC commissioned the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to review and 
incorporate recent UV innovations into the TACMEMO.  This review first established 
a baseline of Naval UV projects. The baseline analyzed the literature listed in the 
reference list and established e-mail exchanges with platforms and activities 
conducting UV operations. Additionally, research was conducted through Naval 
Postgraduate School theses; students interviewed activities conducting UV 
operations that included UAVs operating in combat environments.  The lack of actual 
operational maturity of combat unmanned vehicles significantly impacted the ability to 
conduct a more in-depth analysis for development and recommendations of proven 
fleet combat tactics. Unmanned vehicle systems (UVS) fall into four broad categories: 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), unmanned 
undersea vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). 
Unmanned vehicles systems (UVS) are viewed as a key component of efforts 
to transform US military forces.1 Recent US military operations have highlighted the 
potential of UVS to significantly improve and reshape US military capabilities. 
Perhaps uniquely among the military departments, the Department of the Navy 
(DON), which includes the Marine Corps, may eventually acquire a large variety of 
UVs, including unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned air combat vehicles 
(UCAVs—UAVs armed with weapons), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), 
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).2 
The GWOT continues to place emphasis on the importance of UAVs. The 
Fiscal Year 2006 Budget request reflects the commitment to a focused array of UAVs 
                                            
1 Ronald O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, CRS 






that will support and enhance both surveillance and strike missions with persistent, 
distributed, netted sensors.3 
The Department of the Navy’s plans calls for acquiring UAVs and UCAVs for 
three primary mission areas: (1) long-dwell, persistent, standoff ISR operations; (2) 
penetrating surveillance/suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)/strike operations; 
and (3) tactical surveillance and targeting operations.4 These mission areas support 
primary and secondary missions assigned to Navy platforms required operational 
capability and projected operational environments (ROC/POE) and doctrine to be 
executed by Marine Corps units.  
An USV is a remotely controlled or autonomous craft that operates on the 
surface of the water. In the past and currently, carrier and expeditionary strike groups 
(CSG/ESG) have deployed with Spartan  Scout and Seafox USVs under operational 
and tactical tests.5 The US Navy has been operating USVs for some time, primarily 
as surface targets for gunnery exercises such as the QST-33 and QST-35/35A 
SEPTAR targets, high-speed maneuverable seaborne target (HSMST), and 
RoboSki.6 However, these USVs pale in comparison to the new breed of USVs the 
US Navy is currently testing. 
USVs are an integral part of the Navy’s transformation to a more agile and 
networked force. Navy planners foresee USVs operating in littoral areas and 
protecting the fleet from asymmetric threats, such as terrorists, without subjecting 
operators to direct harm. USV missions include surveillance and reconnaissance, 
                                            
3 House Armed Services Committee statement, FY2006 Navy/Marine Corps Navy R & D in the 
support of the GWOT and Future Naval Capabilities, March 2005.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Wayne Gayle, “Analysis of Operational Manning Requirements and Deployment Procedures for 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles aboard US Navy Ships,” Working Paper (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2006). 
6 Moire Incorporated, “The Growing US Market for USVs,” Accessed; Available from 





force protection, mine detections, and special operations. Undersea warfare (USW) 
and intelligence collection are some of the possible USV missions.  
The USS Pinckney deployed in 2005 with the Navy’s AN/WLD-1 remote mine 
hunting system (RMS), a semi-submerged USV designed to detect submerged 
mines.7 The first littoral combat ship (LCS) scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 
2006 is being designed to be able deploy UAVs, USVs and UUVs.8 The same can be 
said about the new destroyer DD(X) and cruiser CG(X). Although definitive USV 
acquisition plans do not exist, the Navy is pursuing several USV developmental 
programs. The Navy will develop an USV to perform intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) to be deployed from older combatant ships. The ISR USV will 
possibly replace the standard Navy rigid hull inflated boat (RHIB). It will carry EO/IR 
sensors, a targeting device, a radar, and line-of-sight (LOS) and over-the-horizon 
(OTH) communication links. A larger multi-mission version is likely to operate from 
LCS, DD(X) and CG(X), incorporating technologies developed from Spartan Scout 
operational testing.  
The successful implementation of USVs into the Navy surface fleet will depend 
on the early and accurate determination of manpower and subsequent personnel 
assignments. During operational testing of Spartan Scout by USS Gettysburg in 
2003, a Personnel man second class was selected as the remote operator because 
he was the best video game player on board the ship.9 It is imperative that while 
development and testing is being conducted on the USV concept, the operational 
techniques and procedures required for safe and effective operations must be 
developed as well. 
                                            
7 Robert M. Byron, “Sea Power: Bristling with new gear, USS Pinckney,” Accessed; Available from 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738. 
8 Littoral Combat Ship Flight 0 Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document. 


















II. Unmanned Vehicles and Missions 
A.  Background 
Missions assigned to the Department of the Navy as part of National Military 
Strategy in support of a greater National Security Strategy are delineated in the 
required operational capability and projected operational environment (ROC/POE) 
through design capabilities of platforms, staffs and units. The POE describes how an 
organization will operate in a given environment and under what conditions to fulfill 
resource sponsor-prescribed primary and secondary missions. These POE 
statements are further described by ROC elements that are linked to readiness 
through status of resources and training systems (SORTS) reporting. 
Currently, research could not find any Department of the Navy platforms, staffs 
or units with the design capability to execute any unmanned vehicle missions. The 
research found the platforms and missions shown in Table 1 fit existing ROC/POEs 
mission criteria from Expeditionary Warfare N85, Surface Warfare N86 and Aviation 
Warfare N88. 
Platform Missions 
Global Hawk, Predator, Fire Scout,  
Pioneer, Dragon Eye ISR 
Predator, Fire Scout ASUW, FP, Strike, USW, MIW 
Spartan Scout, Seafox ASUW, FP, MIW, USW, MIO 
RMS/RMV USW, MCM, MIW 
Table 1. Naval UV Platforms and Missions 
Currently, UAVs primarily focus on long-dwell, Persistence, standoff ISR, 





(ASUW) and force protection (FP) missions. These missions are broadly categorized 
by sizes and associated platforms (not all inclusive) as shown in Table 2. 
UAV 
greater than 17-ft wingspan 
greater than 14-ft length 
Global Hawk,  






6- to 9-ft wingspan 
2- to 4-ft length  
Dragon Eye 
Micro UAV (MAV) 
 6- to 12-in length & width WASP 
Table 2. UAV Categories 
B. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
1. Global Hawk 
The Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance UAV 
designed to provide wide-area coverage of up to 40,000 nm2 per day. It successfully 
completed its Military Utility Assessment, the final phase of its advanced technology 
concept demonstration (ACTD), in June 2000, and transitioned into engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) in March 2001. It takes off and lands 
conventionally on a runway and currently carries a 1950-lb payload for up to 32 
hours. Global Hawk carries both an EO/IR sensor and a SAR with moving-target-







Figure 1. Global Hawk 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2002. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, 
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., December. 
2. Predator 
MQ-9 Predator is a larger, more capable, turboprop-engined version of the Air 
Force MQ-1B/Predator developed jointly by NASA and General Atomics as high-
altitude endurance UAV for science payloads. Its initial flight occurred in February 
2001. With the capability to carry up to ten Hellfire missiles, the MQ-9 could serve as 
the killer portion of a MQ-1/MQ-9 hunter/killer UAV team.10 
 
Figure 2. Preditor 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2002. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, 
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., December. 






       RQ-2 Pioneer 
 
       Weight: 450 lb 
       Length: 14 ft 
       Wingspan: 16 ft 10 in 
       Payload: 75 lb 
       Ceiling: 15,000 ft 
       Radius: 185 km 
       Endurance: 5 hr 
3. Pioneer 
The Navy/Marine RQ-2 Pioneer has served with Navy, Marine, and Army 
units, deploying aboard ship and ashore since 1986. Initially deployed aboard 
battleships to provide gunnery spotting, its mission evolved into reconnaissance and 
surveillance, primarily for amphibious forces. Launched by rocket assist (shipboard), 
by catapult, or from a runway, it recovers into a net (shipboard) or with arresting gear 
after flying up to 5 hours with a 75-lb payload. The Navy ceased Pioneer operations 








Figure 3. PQ-2 Pioneer 
Source: www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/uav95/pioneer.html. 
4. Fire Scout 
The Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) tactical UAV (VTUAV) 
program is currently in engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and low 
rate initial production (LRIP). Five Air Vehicles and four Ground Control Stations are 
now in Developmental Testing. A significant number of successful test flights have 
been accomplished demonstrating autonomous flight, tactical control data link 
(TCDL) operations, Multi-Mission Payload performance and Ground Control Station 
operations. Fire Scout Tactical Control System developmental testing is scheduled 
for mid-FY03. With continuing FY03 EMD testing successes, the Navy has 
recognized the VTUAV program value for the emerging Landing Craft Support series 
of surface vessels.11 







Figure 4. RQ-8 Fire Scout 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2002. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-
2027, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., December. 
5. Dragon Eye 
Dragon Eye is a mini-UAV (4-foot wingspan and 5-lb weight) developed as the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s (MCWL) answer to the Navy’s over-the-hill 
reconnaissance initiative and the Marines’ interim small unit remote scouting system 
(I-SURSS) requirement. The potential Navy version is referred to as Sea ALL. 
Dragon Eye fulfills the first tier of the Marine Corps’ UAV roadmap by providing the 










      Dragon Eye 
 
      Weight: 5 lb 
      Wingspan: 18 cm 
      Payload: 1 lb 
      Ceiling: 150 m’ 
      Radius: 10 km 






Efforts to create smaller and smaller UAVs has reached the point where the 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are now field testing the seven ounce Wasp Micro Air 
Vehicle (MAV). This is a flat, rectangular “flying wing” (13 inch wingspan, about seven 
inches long) that can stay in the air for about an hour. Once the battery powered 
propeller is spinning, the operator throws Wasp into the air, and off it goes, usually a 
100 feet altitude. You land it by pressing the auto land button after you have entered 
GPS coordinates of where you want it to return to. The propeller often breaks off 
when it lands, but the Wasp was designed for that, and you just snap on another one. 
The MAV is controlled via a hand held device that looks like a Game boy, but has a 
seven inch color screen and controls laid out for easy use. The Wasp carries a GPS, 
and microprocessor that keeps it stable in flight. The operator picks a route via GPS 
coordinates, and can order it to circle an area at any time. Two color video cameras 
are carried (one looking forward, and one looking to the rear), and then the Wasp is a 
hundred feet up, you can make out people below, and whether they are armed. The 
Wasp moves at a speed of 35-75 kilometers an hour (or about 9-19 meters a 
second). The controller can remain in touch with a Wasp that is up to ten kilometers 





Figure 6. WASP 
Source: www.defense-update.com/features/du-2-04/mav-darpa. 
 
                                            
12 www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20054172340  
       WASP 
 
       Weight: 7 oz 
       Length: 7 in 
       Wingspan: 13 in 
       Payload:  
       Ceiling: 100 ft 
       Radius: 10 km 





C. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV)  
Unmanned Surface Vehicles are broadly categorized by size as listed in Table 
3.  The notional handling, launch and recovery procedure found in Appendix B was 
generalized using USS Pearl Harbor’s SEAFOX working documents. These 
procedures have been adapted for a notional RHIB USV and must first be tailored to 
each platform’s USV (such as Spartan Scout) and associated specific davit system.  
The USS Pearl Harbor’s procedure was used as a notional basis for the manpower 
requirements assessment.  
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) 
24-ft RHIB Spartan Scout 





Table 3. USV Categories 
1. Spartan Scout 
Spartan Scout is an evolving unmanned integrated sensor and weapon 
system (Figure 7) designed to be a primary force leveler against asymmetric threats 
by enabling the battleforce commander to match inexpensive threats with an 
appropriate response. As a low-cost force multiplier, Spartan provides increased 
sensor coverage in a netcentric environment, thus enabling the possibility of 
establishing battlespace dominance.13 
Spartan is a remotely controlled, semi-autonomous, modular, multi-mission 
USV centered on the ability to deploy sensors and weapons which provide 
warfighters with a remote, offensive and defensive barrier in the littorals. The 
expanded battlespace coverage afforded by off-board sensors can provide an 
additional layer of defense in the early warning/intercept capability. As a result, 
                                            
13 Naval Undersea Warfare Command, “SPARTAN SCOUT Advance Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) Management Plan Rev 1” (Executive level, living document that is intended to 





Spartan is designed to provide protection for surface combatants, noncombatants, 
and other national and strategic assets. As a node in the battlespace network, 
Spartan’s extended ISR capability facilitates the development of an accurate tactical 






Figure 7. Spartan Scout 
Source: www.military-training-technology.com/article. 
2. Sea Fox 
The Sea Fox is a semi-autonomous, reconfigurable, high-speed, unmanned 
surface vehicle-small (USV-S) (Figure 8). It provides two-way communications with 
intruders, determination of intent of intruders, and intelligence collection of the 
situations at safe standoff distances for manned small patrol boats and Visit, Board, 
Search, and Seizure (VBSS) Teams. The system consists of a Sea Fox USV, the 
Remote Operator Station (ROS) and Mobile Remote Operator Station (MROS). 
Through wireless RF relays, the Sea Fox can engage in two-way voice 
communications and transmit real-time video and infrared imagery to the ROS, thus 
allowing for standoff engagement of potential threats and increased situational 
awareness during Enhanced Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) and VBSS 
missions. 
                                            
 
14 “SPARTAN SCOUT Advance Concept Technology Demonstration Management Plan Rev 1.” 
Spartan Scout 
Weight: 4000 lbs 
Length: 24 ft 
Displacement: 5000 lbs 
Radius: LOS 






Sea Fox is designed to provide force protection with more flexibility in 
EMIO(small boat against small boat scenarios) and safer Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) gathering to aid in threat assessment, decision-making, 
and situational awareness, prior to escalation to lethal actions.15Initially, Sea Fox will 
serve as an extension of the eyes and ears of the VBSS/MIO team, allowing close 






Figure 8. Seafox 
Source: www.military-training-technology.com/article. 
D. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
The Navy’s unmanned undersea vehicle development is quite extensive and 
comprehensive.16 The remote minehunting system (RMS) program has exercised a 
series of developmental prototypes in a fleet environment enroute to a fully supported 
operational system. The RMS (V)1 variant was launched pier-side and operated from 
USS John Young (DD 973) during Kernel Blitz ’95 table 4. A later variant with 
shipboard launch and recovery capabilities was installed and deployed on the USS 
Cushing (DD 985) and successfully demonstrated during SHAREM 119. The final 
RMS variant, AN/WLD- 1(V)1, is now installed and deployed aboard DDGs 91-97.17  
                                            
15 NAVSEA Warfare Center Norfolk “SEAF0X Concept of Operations (CONOPS).” Draft. June 2005. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Gayle, Wayne. “ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL MANNING REQUIREMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT 
PROCEDURES FOR UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES ABOARD US NAVY SHIPS,” Thesis, 
March 2006. 
       Seafox 
 
       Weight: lbs 
       Length: 16 ft 
       Displacement: 2250 lbs 
       Radius: LOS 
       Max speed: 45 kts 





Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV) Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
Remote Minehunting Vehicle (RMV)
Table 4. Naval Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV) 
The AN/WLD-1(V)1 remote minehunting system (RMS) is an off-board system 
that is organic to the Battle Group. It has been designed to meet Fleet demand for 
beyond line-of-sight mine reconnaissance against bottom and moored mines in deep 
and shallow water regions of anticipated operating areas. The semi-autonomous 
system will detect, classify, and identify mines and record their precise location for 
avoidance and/or subsequent removal. The system has been designed to be integral 
to forces deployed anywhere in the world, providing a mine countermeasures 
capability to surface combatant forces in the absence of dedicated mine 
countermeasure forces. The remote minhunting system and its component remote 






Figure 9. Remote Minehunting System 
Source: AN/WLD-1(V)1 Remote Minehunting System Specification, February, 2003. 
      Remote Minehunting System (RMS) and 
      Remote Minehunting vehicle (RMV) 
 
      Depth: 10-200 ft+ 
      Range: LOS/OTH via link 
      Deployment: over the side 
      Endurance: 20 hrs 






III. Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education 
Requirements 
A. Background 
Too frequently resource sponsors do not adequately evaluate newly 
developed systems for critical ROC/POE impacts. Adequate assessment of platform 
and unit capabilities has fallen short in the past. This deficiency is due to a lack of 
understanding of manpower, personnel, training and education (MPTE) policy. Strict 
adherence to the early development of Navy training systems plans (NTSP) is critical 
to MPTE planning. In an ideal world trained personnel, equipment installation and 
logistics for new and improved capabilities would arrive simultaneously. This way 
trained personnel can oversee installation and operational testing. It seems far too 
often properly trained personnel arrive after equipment is installed. A thorough 
understanding of the MPTE process would lead to more informed program objective 
memorandum (POM) decisions, schoolhouse planning, manpower personnel Navy 
(MPN) individual account (IA) student resourcing and execution Manpower, 
Personnel, Training and Education Requirements. 
Common to all UVS is the lack of formal MPTE analysis and subsequent 
published documents specifically stating the quantitative and qualitative manpower 
requirements. As with any new system the MPTE associated lifecycle costs must be 
considered up front. The identification of these requirements provides projections for 
the sailors and marines needed to employ and maintain unmanned vehicle systems 
throughout these systems’ existence. To accomplish this end, the following remains 
to be formally conducted: 
• Perform a formal needs analysis to establish UV requirements by 
platform and system. 
• Convert the needs analysis into requirements and delineate them in 





• Determine if the current personnel inventory possesses adequate KSAs 
to support UV operations. 
• Develop schoolhouse curriculum to support manpower and personnel 
requirements. 
• Mandate a system-specific Navy training systems plan (NTSP) be 
generated as part of the acquisition phase for each platform and 
system. 
B. Manpower and Personnel 
Spartan Scout was ISR configured while assigned to Gettysburg. Eighteen 
personnel consisting of Boatswain’s Mates (BM) and Seamen (SN) were used in the 
launch and recovery of both Spartan Scout and the ship’s RHIB. A minimum of four 
personnel were required to operate Spartan Scout: one to operate the ROS as driver; 
C2 operator to monitor sensor displays; RC operator to control Spartan Scout during 
launch and recovery; and a Coxswain for manned operations.18 USS Gettysburg’s 





















Command and Control (C2) Officer 
Remote Operating Station (ROS) Officer 
Radio Control (RC) PN3 
Coxswain BM2 
Electronic Repair ET3 
Mechanical Repair EN2 
Launch and Recovery Various BMs/Deck Seamen 
Launch and Recovery Various BMs/Deck Seamen 
Table 5. USS Gettysburg’s USV team 
Onboard USS Gettysburg (CG-64), Surface Warfare qualified (designator 
1110) officers supervised command and control operations in order to abide by rules 
of the road and to ensure safe navigation of Spartan Scout. A Personnelman Third 
Class (PN3) served as remote control operator from above-decks once the Spartan 
Scout was within 200 yards of the host ship. The Coxswain provided manual control 
in case of loss of radio control frequency link between Spartan Scout and the host 
ship. After approximately one month of operating with Spartan Scout, CG-64 
demonstrated both night- and day-unmanned operations. Additionally, a senior officer 
in CIC (such as the Operations Officer) served as mission supervisor relaying 
pertinent information to the ship’s Commanding Officer.19  






C. Training and Education requirements 
The Navy does not currently have an established training pipeline for 
unmanned vehicle systems (UVS) in general. The notional unmanned aerial vehicle 
training requirements in Table 6 were derived from actual training developed for 
unmanned undersea vehicles’ (UUV) remote minehunting system (RMS).  





GM1 J-041-0103 AMMO ADMIN N/A 
FCTCLANT, DAM 












0007 MEDAL Supervisor N/A Ingleside, Texas TBD 10 GCCS-M 
FC1 TBD Payload Operator TBD TBD TBD 5 N/A 
OS1 K-221-2503 
ASW/ASUW Tactical Air 
Controller 0324 
CSCS San Diego/ 






2311 GCCS-M Operator 0342 
CSCS San Diego/ 
Damneck, Va C1 TBD N/A 
STG TBD UAV Maintenance (Manufacturer Training) 0525 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
Table 6.  UAV Notional Training 
1. Remote Minehunting System (RMS) Training Requirements 
Currently, personnel working with RMS attend training provided by the Navy 
and the system manufacturer. Existing “A and C” schools provides some rate-specific 
training. Other courses are under development or provided by the manufacturer. The 
current and projected training for RMS operators in the MIW mission area is 





SAILOR CIN COURSE TITLE NEC LOCATION TYPE LENGTH (DAYS) PRE-REQ’S 
STG1 J-041-0103 AMMO ADMIN N/A 
FCTCLANT, DAM 
NECK F1 5 N/A 








0089 MIW OPS Officer Course N/A Ingleside, Texas TBD 5 





0007 MEDAL Supervisor N/A Ingleside, Texas TBD 10 GCCS-M 





ASW/ASUW Tactical Air 
Controller 0324 
CSCS San Diego/ 




2311 GCCS-M Operator 0342 
CSCS San Diego/ 
Damneck, Va C1 TBD N/A 
All A-647-0009 




NSWC Panama City 
FL, LOCMAR 
Syracuse NY 
TBD 10 N/A 
STG A-130-XXXX 
STG C School AN/SQQ-
89A (V)-15 Maintenance 
(Manufacturer Training) 
0525 Chesapeake, Va C1 TBD 




STG TBD MP Computing Environment Maintenance TBD 
NSWC Panama City 
FL TBD TBD N/A 

























IV. Handling Procedures 
A. Notional Handling Procedure 
The handling procedures found in Appendix A were derived from USS Pearl 
Harbor, LSD-52 and are included as a strawman for platforms to tailor their launch-
and-recovery procedures for assigned USVs. It is included in this research as a 
generic starting place for future USV operations and for the development of 
occupational standards for manpower documents. 
These procedures are intended to provide guidance to personnel engaged in 
the launch and recovery of the SEAFOX USV.  Conditions and situations that may 
pose a hazard to personnel or equipment have been identified and evaluated.  This 
procedure has been written to mitigate those conditions and situations. 
In one instance, the USV actually had personnel on board while in operation 
as a precaution to loss of command and control. The launch of a manned chase boat 
prior to launching the USV was found to be a common practice. An in depth 
description of RMS handling can be found in AN/WLD-1(V)1 RMS specification, 26 
February 2003, PEO Mine Warfare. Notional USV evolution requirements for SMD 
section III watchstations is shown in Table 8.  
Position Rate 
Command and Control (C2) Officer 
Remote Operating Station (ROS) Officer 
Radio Control (RC) OS2 
Electronic Repair ET3 
Mechanical Repair EN2 
Launch and Recovery BM3 
Launch and Recovery SN 
Launch and Recovery SN 



















V. Tactics, Weapons and Ordinance 
A. Tactics 
The study resulted in the addition of two UV tactics—the first involving solely 
the use of an UAV and the second involving both an UAV and USV in combination. 
The UAV tactic is to be used in Force Protection (FP) against and in prosecution of 
small-craft attack against a high-value unit (HVU). The second is for protection of a 
HVU during a straits transit. The straits transit tactic can also be used for choke-point 
and archipelagic transits. 
Other changes made to the original TACMEMO (TM 3-22-5-SW) included 
clarification of space deconfliction, a new section addressing armed patrol as a 
technique for unmanned combat vehicles (UCV) and the introduction of ingress-point 
placement in planning the search of an area of interest. 
B. Weapons/Ordnance 
USVs offer a wide variety of remotely operated crew-served weapon systems 
performing an array of Required Operating Capability (ROC)/Projected Operating 
Environment (POE) elements and statements. “USVs can employ a variety of 
modulated Hellfire, Stinger, 25-mm chain gun, 7.62-Gatling gun, dual or single .50 
caliber machine guns, 40-mm grenade launchers, and a variety of non-lethal 
weapons.”20 Figure 5 is a “7 meter Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR), Force Protection (FP) USV with an articulating weapons mount, a .50 caliber 
machine gun and an integrated Javelin missile that participated in the first successful 
“Live Fire” technical demonstration at the Aberdeen Test Center.”21 However, as 
weapon systems alternatives increase, the associated manpower requirements may 
follow too. 
                                            
20 Ricci, Vic. (2002), Spartan Scout Unmanned Surface Vehicle CONOPS, NUWC, July 2002. 
21 Marvin, Ernest and Wasilewski, Mark. (2004), Unmanned Surface Vehicle Mission Module 





Also significant is the performance/certification to handle and employ 
ordnance in support of UCV. The following weapon systems and ordnance are just a 
few that have been proposed or demonstrated in support of UCV missions: 
 Predator 
1. Hellfire 
 Fire Scout 
1. .50 Cal 
2. 2.75 rocket 
3. Cartridge Actuated Devices (CAD) 
4. Smokes 
 Spartan Scout22 
1. ROSAM  
2. .50 Cal Machine Gun 
3. Sea-Javelin 
4. Hellfire Missile 
5. GAU-17A 7.62 Gatlin gun 
6. Stinger 
7. 40mm Grenade Launcher 
8. 25mm Chain Gun 
                                            
22 Marvin, Ernest and Wasilewski, Mark. (2004), Unmanned Surface Vehicle Mission Module 







Figure 5. Spartan Scout with .50 Cal and Javelin mount.23 
1. Remotely Operated Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) 
The ROSAM is currently being evaluated for use on the Spartan Scout USV as 
well as the U.S. Army’s Theater Support Vessel (TSV).24 The ROSAM is the key 
component that provides Spartan Scout USV the capability to employ a variety of 
different weapon systems. The ROSAM’s sighting system is comprised of both 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and an off-mount electro optical device. Its aiming 
system is made up of an optical, ring and post laser designator and laser range finder 
making it an effective fire control system for USV weapons modules.25 The ROSAM’s 
advertised maritime target detection range is rated at 4,400 yards.26 As proven at 
Aberdeen, the ROSAM is a robust system that utilizes an optical target tracker, built-
in fire control, and two-axis weapons correction stabilization in order to provide highly 
                                            
23 Marvin, Ernest and Wasilewski, Mark. (2004), Unmanned Surface Vehicle Mission Module 
Development and Demonstrations, NUWC. 
24 General Dynamics. U.S. Navy Type Classifies MK49 MOD0 Gun Weapon System. Dec 19, 2005. 
[retrieved June 27, 2006] available from world wide web @http:// www.gdatp.com/news/NR-019.htm. 
25 General Dynamics. U.S. Navy Type Classifies MK49 MOD0 Gun Weapon System. Dec 19, 2005. 
[retrieved June 27, 2006] available from world wide web @http:// www.gdatp.com/news/NR-019.htm. 






accurate maritime firepower.27 The overall manpower implication to naval personnel 
is that the USV’s ROSAM must be supported by shipboard personnel. Although the 
ROSAM has been issued the type classification MK49 MOD0 Gun Weapon System, 






Figure 6. MK49 MOD0/ROSAM with M2HB Bushmaster .50 caliber machine 
gun28 
 
2. .50 Cal Machine Gun 
The .50 caliber entered military service in 1921 and has been a proven combat 
weapon since WWII. It is still used by every branch of the U.S. military and scores of 
foreign militaries. Its simple yet effective design is the crux of its staying power. At 
550 rounds per minute the M2HB Bushmaster .50 caliber will provide USV C2/Sensor 
operators with substantial fire power. A USV with a remotely operated .50 caliber 
weapons module will be a formidable addition to any Commanding Officers layered – 
defense architecture. However, the real benefit may be that adding the .50 caliber to 
the USV arsenal will not require additional manpower to support the weapon.  
                                            
27 General Dynamics. U.S. Navy Type Classifies MK49 MOD0 Gun Weapon System. Dec 19, 2005. 
[retrieved June 27, 2006] available from world wide web @http:// www.gdatp.com/news/NR-019.htm. 







The Javelin anti-tank missile was developed by the U.S. Army. It is a shoulder 
launched, fire and forget missile, with an imaging infrared (I2R) guidance system. 
“The Javelin consists of a missile in a disposable launch tube and a reusable 
Command Launch Unit (CLU) with a trigger mechanism and the integrated day/night 
sighting device for surveillance, and target acquisition and built-in test capabilities 
and associated electronics. The CLU, powered by a disposable battery, provides the 
capability for battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, missile launch, and damage 
assessment. The Javelin night vision sight (NVS) is a passive I2R system.”29 It also 
has an advertised effective range of approximately 2000 meters or about 2200 yards. 
 
 
Figure 9. USV ROSAM Javelin/.50 cal mount30 
Although the range of Javelin is limited, it is still a viable alternative for USVs. 
A USV equipped with Javelin will be a lethal weapon at sea, capable of ASUW, 
ATFP, and perhaps Anti Air Warfare (AAW) for low slow-flying aircraft. The sea borne 
application of the imaging infrared (I2R) guidance system is a good fit because the 
ocean provides a steady constant temperature to contrast a maritime target. Javelin 
                                            
29 Javelin Anti-tank Missile. [retrieved May 5, 2006] article available on world wide web 
@http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/javelin.htm. 






is a fire and forget weapon, whereby USV C2 operators can launch the weapon and 
quickly maneuver to a safe position outside the target vessels weapons release 
range. However, at Aberdeen the Javelin Live-Fire testing was called off due poor 
platform stability issues. 
4. Hellfire Missile 
The Hellfire missile is a semi-active laser guided, subsonic anti-tank missile. 
The Hellfire has an effective range of over 6nm. Hellfire missiles are commonly used 
by Navy SH-60/HH-60 helicopters for ASUW operations. Originally designed as an 
air-to surface missile, the Hellfire has evolved into a quality air-to-air weapon used to 
engage helicopters or slow moving fixed wing aircraft. The Hellfire can be guided to 
its target by a laser provided by either the helicopter or a shipboard MK80 
Illuminator.31 USV’s armed with Hellfire missiles would be a formidable asset capable 
of effective ASUW or ATFP operations.  In addition, USVs with Hellfire would provide 
a quality buffer for a HVU during a strait transit scenario. 
 
Figure 14. HELLFIRE MISSILE (AGM-114A) 32 
When SH-60/HH-60 Helicopter Detachments deploy with ships, they bring the 
Hellfire with them. The Aviation Ordnance men (AO) assigned to the Helo 
Detachments for the maintenance, loading and unloading of all air launched 
                                            
31 U.S. Navy Official Website. FACT FILE. [Retrieved May 31, 2006] available on world wide web 
@http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp.  






weapons, including the Hellfire. However, GMs also have experience in handling 
Hellfire missiles on ships. If Hellfire is to become a USV weapons module, the fleet 
must decide if the AO and/or GM ratings will provide the manpower to support it. 
Currently, the Aviation Ordnance NEC AO-6801 is dedicated to performing fleet 
intermediate maintenance ashore and at sea for all air launched weapons. 
5. GAU-17A, 7.62 mm Gatling Gun 
The GAU-17A Gatling Gun is an effective combat weapon that is typically 
mounted to aircraft. It is “air-cooled, multi-barreled and electrically powered with a 
firing rate up to 3,000 rounds per minute.”28 A USV with a GUA-17A ROSAM mount 
would be an effective ATFP platform. Like the .50 caliber, the benefit of adding the 
GAU-17A to the USV arsenal is that it will not require additional manpower to support 
the weapon because it is a crew served weapon on surface combatants. If the Navy 
uses the GAU-17A as a USV weapons module it will have no significant manpower 
implications with regards to maintenance, loading/unloading and delivery. 
 
Figure 16. GAU-17A fired from CG2933 
 
                                            
33 WIKIPEDIA Online Encyclopedia. Minigun Image from USS Philippine Sea. [retrieved June 11, 





















VI. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
A.  Summary 
The mission remains to bring the fight to the enemy. The nation will continue 
to execute the GWOT while transforming for the future fight. There will be a need for 
Naval forces to continue to refine operational concepts and appropriate technology 
investments to deliver the kind of dominant military power from the sea envisioned by 
sea power 21. There will be a continued need to pursue operational concepts for 
seabasing persistent combat power as we invest in technology and systems to 
enable Naval vessels to deliver decisive, effects-based combat power in every 
tactical and operational dimension.34 
Manpower requirements for unmanned vehicle system operations on board 
cruiser and destroyer (CRUDES) platforms are not quantified and qualified in either 
operational manning or watchstation sections of ship-class manpower management 
documents. Such identification supports the total force manpower concept and 
strength planning for unmanned vehicle systems in the Navy and could easily be 
included in LCS and DD (X) preliminarily ship manpower document (PSMD) 
development and Navy training systems plans (NTSP). Similar finding where found 
for Marine Corps manpower management in the tables of organization and 
equipment (TO&E). 
Through discussions with commands operating various unmanned vehicle 
platforms none were found to be programs of record. It can only be assumed that the 
lack of a total force manpower planning process for unmanned systems is due to the 
majority of these systems not being programs of record.  
                                            
34 House Armed Services Committee statement, FY2006 Navy/Marine Corps Navy R & D in the 





Naval combat unmanned vehicle employment, for the most part, remains in 
the research and development stage and not readily available as a CSG/ESG-force 
capability (of which contractors currently play a significant role). Additionally, it is 
recognized that unmanned vehicles compete for air- and water-space management 
along with manned platforms—further complicating already complex warfighting 
issues. 
B.  Conclusions 
Unmanned vehicles are anything but unmanned. The inclusion of these 
platforms must be viewed as the inclusion of operational capabilities of deploying 
ESG/CSGs in today’s Navy. Any notion of cost savings using unmanned vehicles is 
predominately false. Simply adding UVs does not result in manpower cost savings, 
but does allow persistent on-station time and generally removes the operator from 
harm. 
Some roadblocks remain in order to fully integrate unmanned vehicles into the 
force. The more minor roadblocks are cultural or organizational. These take the form 
of who is most qualified (officer or enlisted) to operate the flight controls and 
payloads. Other concerns are the use of unmanned vehicles in U.S and international 
air space. How other countries and international law perceive unmanned vehicles.  
The inclusion of key performance parameters (KPP) is critical to UV 
acquisition. Early integration of the human’s role in UV operations facilitates force 
planning and allocation of already limited resources. Navy training systems plans 
(NTSP) analysis is critical in the developmental testing phase of have unmanned 
vehicles. The timely development of manpower, personnel and training requirements 
is critical to supporting the notion of the right person at the right place at the right time 
with the right KSAs before UVs are delivered to the fleet as a force capability.  This 
practice will best manage the Navy’s capital investments and better realize its Human 
Capital return on investment. 
The CRUDES fleet would immediately benefit by the removal of Captain’s 





enhance mission capabilities. An analysis of N85 and N86 CRUDES ROC/POEs 
revealed no impact to primary or secondary warfighting missions by removing the gig 
and, in today’s capabilities-based warfighting supports a global concept of 
operations. 
Operator knowledge, skills and abilities must be a KPP in UV design. This 
research was limited primarily to operational UCV experimentations. Current tactics 
are too immature to establish valid doctrine on their use. Of particular concern is UV 
Naval weapons release authority and weapons safety issues. 
C.  Recommendations 
1. Research suggests the following: 
a. Increase warfighting capabilities by replacing all Captains’ gigs on 
CRUDES and appropriate expeditionary warfare platforms with 
unmanned surface vessels to increase platform capabilities. 
b. Add USV launch and recovery manpower requirements to appropriate 
ship class SMDs. Add USV requirements (in addition to current the 
RHIB requirements) as appropriate, mandate this be part of the Navy 
training systems plan (NTSP) review and preliminary ship manpower 
documents. 
c. Ensure the acquisition process includes key performance parameters 
along with explicit Navy training systems plan for the incorporation of 
unmanned vehicle systems. 
d. Disseminate existing UV TACMEMO to fleet for operational validation of 
tactics, provide feed back to Naval Warfare Development Command 
and continue development of the unmanned vehicle tactical 
memorandum to include a dedicated expansion of the tactics and use 
of unmanned combat vehicle systems. 
e. Commission a study to review the manpower, personnel, training and 
education force structure issues and costs. 
f. Those systems that have been operating for an extended period should 
be made programs of record in order to facilitate the systems 
integration approach to total force capabilities and Manpower, 






















Byron, Robert M. “Sea Power: Bristling with New Gear, USS Pinckney.” 
Accessed   Available from www.findarticles.com/articles/mi_qa3738. 
Cobian, Daniel. “Sea Javelin: Analysis of Naval Force Protection Alternatives.” 
Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002.  
Duhan, Daniel. “Tactical Decision Aid for Unmanned Vehicles in Maritime 
Missions.” Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 
2005. 
Gayle, Wayne. “Analysis of Operational Manning Requirements and Deployment 
Procedures for Unmanned Surface Vehicles aboard US Navy Ships.” 
Working Paper. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006. 
Hatch, Gowen and Loadwick. “Littoral Combat Ship Alternative Aviation Support 
Study.” NPS-GSBPP-04-004. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 2004.  
House Armed Services Committee statement, FY2006 Navy/Marine Corps Navy 
R & D in the support of the GWOT and Future Naval Capabilities, March 
2005.  
Littoral Combat Ship Flight 0 Preliminary Design Interim Requirements 
Document. 
Moire Incorporated. “The Growing US Market for USVs.” Accessed   Available 
from http://www.moireinc.com/USVmarketMoire.pdf. 9 July 2003. 
National Academies Press. Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval 
Operations. Washington, DC: author, 2005. 
O’Rourk, Ronald. Unmanned vehicles for US Naval Forces: Background and 
Issues for Congress. CRS report RS21294. Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress.   
Richter, LT Matthew, USS Gettysburg. “Spartan Scout Fleet Testing.” 2003.  
US Department of the Navy. Concept of Operations for the Navy Persistent 
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. 
Washington, DC: author, April 2005. 
US Department of the Navy. “Integration of Unmanned Vehicles into Maritime 
Missions.” TM 3-22-5-SW. Navy Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO). 
Washington, DC: author.  
US Department of the Navy. Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Joint Test and 




















Appendix A. Notional USV Launch and Recovery 
Procedures 
DEFINITION: For the purpose of these procedures, sea state 3 is defined as 
significant (average of one-third highest) wave heights up to 5 feet, average 
wave period 8 seconds, sustained winds up to 16 knots.  
NOTE: THESE PROCEDURES WERE DEVELOPED FOR LAUNCH AND 
RECOVERY OF NAVY RHIBS IN CONDITIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING SEA 
STATE 3 WHILE TRAVELING AT 3 TO 5 KNOTS INTO QUARTERING SEAS 
WITH A LEE ON THE STARBOARD SIDE.  ANY CONDITIONS OUTSIDE OF 
THIS OPERATING WINDOW LISTED MAY REDUCE THE SAFETY OF THE 
LAUNCH/RECOVERY EVOLUTIONS AND MUST BE APPROVED BY THE 
OFFICER IN CHARGE.  
For ready reference, these procedures have been separated into the following 
categories: 
1.  EQUIPMENT LIST 
2.  PERSONNEL CHECKLIST 
3.  PRE-LAUNCH AND RECOVERY CHECKS 
4.  USV LAUNCHING 
5.  USV RECOVERY 
1. EQUIPMENT LIST  
a) Cargo crane 
b) USV lifting pendant and lifting hook  
c) USV lifting sling w/shackles 
d) 2 steadying line leader lines w/ snap hooks (attached to fore and aft 
pad eyes on USV) 
e) 1 sea painter leader line w/ snap hooks (attached to forward pad eye of 
USV) 
f) Steadying lines 
g) 1 lifting sling leader w/ snap hook (attached to lifting sling ring) 
h) Ship’s capstans, bollards and cleats 
i) 1 boat hook (on board chase boat) 








2. PERSONNEL CHECKLIST 
a) Officer in Charge (OIC) shall supervise the entire boat handling 
operation.   
b) Safety Officer 
c) Line handlers  
d) Crane Operator 
e) Chase boat crew (Coxswain, Boat Hook and Aft line handler, USV 
operations personnel) 
 
3. PRE-LAUNCH AND RECOVERY CHECKS: 
NOTE: THE CHASE BOAT SHALL BE LAUNCHED PRIOR TO LAUNCHING 
THE RHIB.  THE CHASE BOAT WILL STAND OFF ON THE STARBOARD 
SIDE OF THE SHIP UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO A POINT 
BETWEEN THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE SHIP AND THE INBOARD SIDE 
OF THE USV AFTER THE USV BECOMES WATERBORNE. 
a. Muster the OIC, the chase boat crew, line handlers, and the crane 
operator.  Ensure that all crewmembers are wearing proper personnel 
safety equipment (i.e., Lifejackets, hard hats and safety shoes) and 
have been briefed on and understand their duties.   
b. Perform any pre-operational checks required on the USV RHIB 
communication equipment. 
c. Launch the chase boat.  
d. Establish communications with the chase boat crew. 
e. Inspect the operating area to ensure there are no foreign objects that 
might interfere with operation.  Ensure the USV securing tie downs are 
removed and stowed clear of the handling area. 
f. Ensure the USV lifting sling is properly installed and ready for use.  
Verify that the sling will not foul any USV antennas or other gear during 
launch. 
NOTE:     THE USV LIFTING PENDANT, WHEN INSTALLED ON THE CRANE 
AUXILIARY HOIST HOOK, ASSISTS IN PROTECTING PERSONNEL IN THE 
CHASE BOAT AND PREVENTS DAMAGE TO THE USV BY KEEPING THE 
CRANE AUXILIARY HOISTING HOOK CLEAR OF THE USV.   
g. Rig the USV lifting pendant to the crane auxiliary hoist hook. 
h. Ensure the crane auxiliary hoist hook throat is moused closed to 
secure the USV lifting pendant into the hook. 
i. Ensure the boat bilges are dry, and the bilge plugs are in place, and 
the USV is ready to launch (fuel and oil levels are correct). 
j. Attach the forward and aft steadying lines to their respective leader 





k. Ensure the sea painter is properly attached to the sea painter leader 
line on the USV. 
l. Ensure all non-operating personnel are clear of the area. 
m. Notify the chase boat coxswain that the USV is ready to launch. 
n. Confirm with the crane operator that the crane is ready to operate. 
o. Confirm the line handlers are ready for launch/recovery. 
p. Establish communication with the bridge, and advise that preparations 
for USV launch/recovery are completed and the USV is ready to be 
launched/recovered. 
WARNING: ALL REPORTED SAFETY AND OPERATING DEFICIENCIES 
MUST BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO START OF HANDLING OPERATIONS. 
4. USV LAUNCHING:      
a. Ensure pre-operational checks were conducted and are satisfactory.  
The OIC and safety observer will observe the entire USV handling 
evolution and stop the handling operation immediately if abnormal or 
unusual conditions arise. 
b. Ensure all handling personnel are familiar with the planned evolution 
and their responsibilities.   Instruct the USV handling crew and crane 
operator to immediately report any abnormal or unusual conditions 
observed during launch operations. 
c. Assign the USV handling crew and crane operator to their stations. 
d. Advise the Bridge that the USV is ready to launch.  On authorization 
from the bridge, begin handling operation.   
e. Lower the crane auxiliary hoist hook and attach the USV lifting 
pendant. Position the USV lifting pendant over the USV lifting point.  
WARNING: ENSURE THE USV SLING RING IS PROPERLY SEATED IN THE 
THROAT OF THE QUICK RELEASE HOOK AND ENSURE THE HOOK IS 
SECURELY LATCHED. 
f. Lower the USV lifting pendant, and attach the USV sling ring to the 
lifting hook of the pendant.  Ensure the USV sling ring is securely 
latched in the lifting hook of the USV lifting pendant. 
g. Hoist the USV high enough to clear the stowage cradle and life rails. 
NOTE: THE LAUNCH POSITION OF THE SEAFOX SHOULD BE FAR 
ENOUGH OUTBOARD SO AS TO HAVE ENOUGH ROOM TO SAFELY 
MANEUVER THE CHASE BOAT BETWEEN THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE 
SHIP AND THE PORT SIDE OF THE USV. 
h. Slew the USV into launch position. 
i. Lower the USV to the water.  Use the steadying lines to tend the USV 





taut as the USV is taken in tow.   The USV operator shall start the 
engine. 
j. Maneuver the chase boat alongside the port side of the USV and 
maintain this station. 
NOTE: A BOAT HOOK FROM THE CHASE BOAT MAY BE NEEDED TO 
REACH THE RELEASE LANYARD, STEADYING LINES, AND SEA PAINTER 
LEADER LINE. 
CAUTION: THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF RELEASING THE USV 
STEADYING LINES, HOIST HOOK, AND SEA PAINTER IS IMPORTANT TO 
ATTAIN A SAFE LAUNCH OF THE USV WHILE THE SHIP IS UNDERWAY. 
k. The aft steadying line handler will slack the aft steadying line until the 
chase boat crew can reach it.  The chase boat crewmember will 
unhook the aft steadying line from the aft leader line at the leader line 
release hook. 
l. The aft line handler will retrieve the aft steadying line. 
m. The chase boat crewmember shall hook the aft leader line to the USV 
grab bar. 
n. The fwd steadying line handler will slack the fwd steadying line until the 
chase boat crew can reach it.  The chase boat crewmember will 
unhook the fwd steadying line from the fwd leader line at the leader 
line release hook. 
o. The fwd line handler will retrieve the fwd steadying line. 
p. The chase boat crewmember shall hook the fwd leader line to the USV 
grab bar. 
q. Using the release lanyard on the USV lifting hook, the chase boat 
crewmember shall release the lifting hook.  The chase boat crew shall 
signal to the OIC that it is safe to raise the crane auxiliary hoist hook.  
Upon receipt of authorization from the OIC, the crane operator shall 
raise the crane auxiliary hoist hook. 
r. The sling ring of the USV shall be hooked to the USV grab bar using 
the sling ring leader line. 
s. The USV operator shall increase the speed of the USV in order to 
create slack in the sea painter.  The chase boat shall match this speed 
increase. 
t. The chase boat crew will then release the sea painter from the USV 
sea painter leader line using the sea painter quick release hook. 
u. The chase boat crewmember will hook the sea painter leader line to 
the USV grab bar. 
v. The USV operator will maneuver the USV away from the ship and 
commence with the planned operation. 






x. All shipboard handling gear shall be stowed until the USV is to be 
recovered.  The crane will be returned to the stowed position. 
5. USV RECOVERY: 
a. Ensure all applicable pre-operational checks in paragraph 3 have been 
accomplished and are satisfactory. 
b. Ensure all handling personnel are familiar with the planned evolution and 
their responsibilities.  Instruct the USV handling crew and crane operator 
to immediately report any abnormal or unusual conditions observed during 
recovery operations. 
c. Assign the line handlers and crane operator to their stations 
d. Advise the Bridge that the USV is ready to recover.  Upon authorization 
from the Bridge, begin the USV recovery operation. 
NOTE: ISSUE CLEAR AND SUFFICIENT ADVANCE WARNING THAT BOAT 
HANDLING OPERATIONS ARE COMMENCING. 
e. Using the cargo crane, lower the hoisting hook and attach the USV lifting 
pendant.  Ensure the crane auxiliary hoist hook throat is moused closed to 
secure the pendant into the crane auxiliary hoist hook. 
f. Position the lifting hook of the USV lifting pendant approximately 15 feet 
off of the water at the pickup point of the USV. 
g. Maneuver the USV to a position 5 to 6 feet forward of the USV lifting 
pendant. 
h. Maneuver the chase boat to a position alongside the USV between the 
ship and the USV. 
CAUTION: THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF ATTACHING THE USV 
SEAPAINTER, STEADYING LINES AND LIFTING HOOK IS IMPORTANT TO 
ATTAIN A SAFE RECOVERY OF THE USV WHILE THE SHIP IS UNDERWAY. 
i. Once the chase boat is alongside the USV, lower the sea painter to the 
chase boat.  Detach the sea painter leader line hook from the USV grab 
bar, and attach the sea painter to the sea painter leader line. 
j. Reduce the speed of the USV so that the sea painter is allowed to deploy 
to its pre-determined full length.  Follow this maneuver with the chase 
boat. 
k. Lower the forward steadying line to the chase boat.  Detach the forward 
steadying line leader line from the USV grab bar, and attach it to the 
forward steadying line.   
l. Lower the aft steadying line to the chase boat.  Detach the aft steadying 
line leader line from the USV grab bar, and attach it to aft steadying line.   
m. Lower the USV lifting hook pendant to the outboard edge of the chase 
boat at a point amidships of the USV.  Detach the USV sling ring leader 
line from the grab bar, and secure the sling ring into the lifting hook of the 





n. Signal the crane operator that it is safe to take any slack out of the USV 
lifting pendant. 
o. Maneuver the chase boat to a stand-off position away from the ship. 
p. Upon command from the OIC, hoist the USV from the water.  Shut down 
the USV engine as it comes out of the water.   
q. Tend the steadying lines to control the motion of the USV during hoist 
operations. 
r. Place the USV in its stowage cradle. 
s. Secure the USV in its stowage using the tie-downs.  Once the USV is 
secure, release the lifting hook of the USV lifting pendant from the USV 
lifting sling.  Stow steadying lines and any other gear used in the recovery 
process. 
t. Remove the USV lifting pendant from the crane auxiliary hoist hook and 
stow it in a secure area. 
u. Recover and stow the chase boat. 





Appendix B: Acronym List  
Acronym Definition 
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
ADC Air Defense Commander 
AMRDEC Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering 
Command 
AO Area of Operations 
AOI Area of Interest 
AOR Area of Responsibility 
AOU Area of Uncertainty 
ARG Amphibious Readiness Group 
AREC Air Resource Element Coordinator 
ASR Armed Surface Reconnaissance 
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare 
ASUWC Anti-Surface Warfare Coordinator 
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
USW Antisubmarine Warfare 
AT Antiterrorism 
ATG Afloat Training Group 
ATO Air Tasking Order 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
BLOS Beyond Line-Of-Sight (ranges from 10-100nm) 
BM Boatswain’s Mate 
C2 Command and Control 
C4ISR 
 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CAS Close Air Support 
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
CCOI Critical Contact of Interest 
CDC Combat Direction Center 
CDP Cumulative Detection Probability 
COE Critical Operations Effectiveness 
CIC Combat Information Center 
COI Critical Operational Issue 
CPA Closest Point of Approach 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COP Common Tactical Picture 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 






D3M Deterrence, Detection, Defense, and Mitigation 
DIW Dead In the Water 
ECM Electronic Countermeasure 
EMI Electro Magnetic Interference 




ES Electronic Support 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
ES/SIGINT Electronic Support/Signals Intelligence 
ET Electronics Technician 
FOV Field of View 
FP Force Protection 
GCS Global Command Station 
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System Maritime 
GEOSIT Geographical Situation 
GM Gunner’s Mate 
GOTS Government Off-The-Shelf 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HM Hospital Corpsman 
HVA High-Value Assets 
HVU High-Value Unit 
ID Identification 
IAP Integrated Assessment Plan 
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support 
IMINT Imagery Intelligence 
IMPI Integrated Maritime Platforms International 
INU Inertial Navigation Unit 
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 
IR Infrared 
ISB Intermediate Staging Base 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
ISR&T Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting 
ISMA In-Stride Mine Avoidance 
IT Information Systems Technician 
I&W Indications and Warning 
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
JLOTS Joint Logistics Over the Shore 
JTF Joint Task Force 
J-UCAS Joint USAF-Navy Unmanned Combat Air System 






L&R Launch and Retrieval 
LAMPS Light Airborne Multipurpose Platform  
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LEC LAMPS Element Coordinator 
LFA Lead Federal Agency 
LMRS Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System  
LOS Line-of-Sight (ranges from 0-10 nm) 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuations 
METOC Meteorological and Oceanographic 
METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain & Weather, Troops & Support Available, & 
Time Available 
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operation 
MIW Mine Warfare 
MIUW Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
MODLOC Miscellaneous Operations Detail Local 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
MROS Mobile Remote Operator Station 
MUA Military Utility Assessment 
MUAV Micro-UAV 
MUVAM Maritime UV Assignment Model 
NAI Named Area of Interest 
NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 
NLW Non-Lethal Weapon 
NVD Night Vision Device 
NVG Night Vision Goggles 
OJT On the Job Training 
OM Operational Manager 
OMI Operator-Machine Interface 
OPCON Operational Control 
ORM Organizational Risk Management 
OTC Officer in Tactical Command 
OTH Over-The-Horizon (ranges greater than 100nm) 
PE Precision Engagement 
PIC Payload Interface Controller 
PID Positive Identification 
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements 
PS Precision Strike 
PTZ Pan/Tilt Zoom 
R/C Remote Control 






RF Radio Frequency 
RFI Radio Frequency Interference 
RMP Recognized Maritime Picture 
RPM Revolutions Per Minute 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
ROS Remote Operator Station 
RSN Royal Singapore Navy 
SAG Surface Action Group 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SCC Sea Combat Commander 
SD Search and Detection 
SDHSS Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift 
SENSO Sensor Operator 
SIGINT Signal Intelligence 
SK Storekeeper 
SOCA Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority 
SOF Special Operations Force 
SS Sea State 
SSC Surface, Search and Control 
SUAV Small UAV 
SUW Surface Warfare 
SUW C&R SUW Coordination & Reporting 
SWC Strike Warfare Commander/Coordinator 
TACON Tactical Control 
TACSUP Tactical Supervisor 
TAO Tactical Action Officer 
TAWS Target Acquisition Weapons System software 
TCS Tactical Control System 
TFCC Tactical Flag Command Center 
TOE Table of Organization and Equipment 
TOS Time on Station 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
TSV Theater Support Vessel 
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
TUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
USV-S Unmanned Surface Vehicle-Small 
USW Undersea Warfare 






UUV Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
VAC Vital Area Center 
VAL/VER Validation/Verification 
VBSS Vertical Board Search & Seizure 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VID Visual Identification 
VTOL Vertical Take Off Landing 
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